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1 Introduction
Does the ¯nancial crisis mean career crisis for new labor market entrants, youth, less educated groups
during the period after a crisis? This paper examines the impacts of crisis on labor market outcomes
utilizing the evidence that Thailand's the ¯nancial crisis in the fall of 1997 exogenously shifted only the
¯rm's labor demand schedule. This exogenous and temporal aggregate shock is useful for identifying the
impacts of the matching market conditions on employment, wages, and career dynamics subsequent to the
¯nancial crisis. This shock is also useful for identifying the complexity of the relative importance between
returns to age (or to potential labor market experience) and years of schooling in the period after the
crisis. To determine the causal e®ects of the ¯nancial crisis on aggregate labor market, we exclude not
only the possibility of information problems in the job search and hiring process but also technological
changes under the ¯nancial crisis. This paper does not consider the possibility of causal e®ects of ¯nancial
crisis on frictional unemployment due to imperfect information on job and worker location. This paper
also excludes the causal e®ects of ¯nancial crisis on structural unemployment due to mismatches between
worker skills and ¯rm technology. Exogenous aspects of ¯nancial crisis enable us to concentrate on cyclical
unemployment due to voluntary unemployment involving worker transitions from declining industries to
booming industries and involuntary unemployment like plant closings and demand shortages. Thanks to
exogenous shifts in the labor demand, we can provide convincing evidence of the contribution of age and years
of schooling to employment outcomes, i.e., labor force participation and wages. This paper is stimulated
by seminal studies of economy-wide job training programs on individual outcomes. The bene¯t of using
such experiments is shown in studies of the causal e®ects of government-provided training program on the
duration of participants' subsequent employment, unemployment spells, and earnings by Ham and LaLonde
(1996) and by Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998). This paper is also stimulated by the studies on
heterogeneity among displaced workers: Krueger and Summers (1988), Gibbons and Katz (1991), Gibbons
and Katz (1992), Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993), Neal (1995), Parent (2000), Kriechel (2003),
and Dustmann and Meghir (2005). Recently, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) and Angrist and Krueger
(2001) summarize the bene¯ts and shortcomings of natural experiments to compare the long-run outcome
of treatment and control group using experimental or empirical data.
The empirical bottom line of this paper is based on the following works of empirical assessment of recent
¯nancial crisis on the labor market and households. One project focuses on the ¯nancial crisis in Indonesia.
Another focuses on Argentina. Smith, Thomas, Frankenberg, Beegle and Teruel (2002) study the e®ects of
the Indonesian ¯nancial crisis on wages and employment using household panel data from the Indonesian
Family Life Survey (hereafter IFLS). They ¯nd that aggregate employment has remained robust because
of industry-to-industry mobility. On the other hand, there was a dramatic decline of around 40% in the
real hourly wages for urban workers. Frankenberg, Smith and Thomas (2003) argues the question of the
household consumption response to the Indonesian the ¯nancial crisis. They show in full detail using IFLS,
2
that households reduced spending on semi-durables while maintaining expenditures on foods. Thomas,
Beegle, Frankenberg, Sikoki, Strauss and Teruel (2004) extend the question of household response to the
crisis to education expenditures for the next generation using IFLS. They ¯nd that household spending on
education declined among the poorest households. They also ¯nd clear evidences of investment irreversibility
in education. Educational spending was reduced among poor households with many young children, while
there was a tendency to maintain education expenditures in poor households with older children. Finally,
McKenzie (2004) examines the e®ects of the 2002 the ¯nancial crisis on households in Argentina and the
urban labor market response, using panel data from an urban area survey. He ¯nds that the crisis had a
large aggregate e®ect, with 63% su®ering a real income fall of 20% or more major job destruction.
Two testable implications are drawn from our theoretical framework: (1) selection tightens for new
entrants in the period after the crisis because of lower labor demand due to the negative productivity shock;
(2) the gap of employment opportunities and wages between new entrants in the period before and after
the crisis persists. To examine the impacts of ¯nancial shock on the transition from school to work and
subsequent career dynamics, we attempt to combine a search-theoretic framework with Mincer type wage
regressions. We brie°y explain our empirical implementation. First, we identify the treatment group and
the control group in the face of the crisis using the individual record of \years of labor market experience" in
our dataset in the period after the crisis. There are two treatment groups. The ¯rst, denoted by T1, is new
entrants in the period after the crisis. This group seems to have di±culties ¯nding jobs after entering the job
search market due to the shock. The second treatment group, denoted by T2 is new entrants in the period
before the crisis working in the period after the crisis. They were also a®ected by the unexpected shock.
On the other hand, the control group, denoted C1, is new entrants in the period before the crisis working
in the period before the crisis. The groups with subscript 1 (C1 and T1) are new entrants in the period
before the crisis. We examine the impacts of ¯nancial shock on the entry-level job market by comparing
the outcomes between the treatment and control groups. Secondly, we examines whether returns to age (or
potential labor market experience) and years of schooling change or not during the period after the crisis.
These parameters rule the labor market outcome.
From the viewpoint of our empirical implementation, using crisis as a natural experiment, it is di±-
cult for new entrants to ¯nd jobs in the period after a crisis. This evidence supports an aspect of the
selection hypothesis. This is consistent with the statistical ¯ndings of Behrman, Deolalikar, Tinakorn and
Chandoevwit (2000). We summarize our empirical results as follows: (1) the selection of the entry-level
job market hypothesis is supported; (2) the gap of employment opportunities and wages between treatment
(with shock) and control groups (without shock) increases over time. This shows the cohort e®ects of the
¯nancial crisis on new entrants. Evidence from our dataset, Thailand Labor Force Survey, supports the
conclusion that both employment opportunities and wages shrunk for new entrants after the crisis. We ¯nd
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that new entrants before the crisis also experienced job losses and wage losses. But these losses were smaller
than those of new entrants after the crisis. We also ¯nd that new entrants after the crisis experienced a 10%
reduction in the overtime wage level than new entrants before the crisis.
The structure of this paper is as followings. Next section 2 introduces the Thailand the ¯nancial crisis in
the summer of 1997 as a natural experimental setting. Section 3 simply models our theoretical background
to derive empirical hypotheses. Section 4 presents our data source, descriptive statistics, and key variables.
Section 5 shows the impacts of crisis on the entry-level labor market. Our empirical results on the impacts
of crisis on cohort e®ects for new entrants are shown in section 6. Concluding remarks are presented in the
¯nal section.
2 Estimating the Impacts of the Crisis for Career Determination
2.1 The Thai Financial Crisis of 1997
The ¯nancial crisis in Thailand in 1997 drastically changed labor market outcomes, labor force character-
istics, and wage-pro¯les drastically. The crisis occurred in the early fall of 1997. It disturbed the labor
market beginning in early 1998. It a®ected the unemployment rate, level of real wages, retention rate, and
recruitment frequency through large-scale job destruction. Behrman and Tinakorn (2000) and Behrman et
al. (2000) report and summarizes the labor market situations in those periods. They show the impacts of
the crisis on the youth labor market and incumbent workers, percentage changes of employment, under-
employed, unemployment, and the level of real average wages during the period before (1995-1996) and
the period after the crisis (1998-1999). There was a particularly large negative shock for youth seeking
employment. Real wages declined by approximately 10%. This paper formalizes the empirical evidences
from previous literatures to create the treatment and control groups.
The ¯nancial crisis started from the ¯nancial market. It then spilled over from the ¯nancial sector to
the manufacturing sector and commodity markets. It was an unexpected and exogenous shock for most
incumbent workers and new entrants to the labor market. This paper takes Thailand' the ¯nancial crisis
as a natural experiment. From a statistical point of view, it is useful to focus on longitudinal evidence
for the displacement of workers. We attempt to identify the contribution to the wage level of schooling,
years of labor market experience, sector tenure, and ¯rm speci¯c tenure. Because this paper can not follow
longitudinal evidence on individuals in the period before and after the crisis, we adopt another approach:
seeking the di®erence of employment probability and wage level to identify the treatment group and control
group using the exogenous shock.
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2.2 Wage Pro¯les and Returns to Labor Market Experience
We compare the determinants of wage level in the period before the crisis with that in the period after the
crisis. Firms, incumbent workers, and potential entrants faced demand shortages and job destruction in the
period after the crisis. We assume that the distribution of unobserved individual abilities is not di®erent
between the two periods. Due to the labor demand shortages in the period after the crisis, it was di±cult for
new entrants to ¯nd employment and for current incumbents to move from job to job. Table 1 reveals clear
contrasts in the contribution of age e®ects between the two periods. In short, estimates of the coe±cient of
age and square of age declined, while the e®ect of years of schooling was maintained in the period after the
crisis. These results prompt us to search for the driving forces behind the two wage equations. There is a
steep rise in the intercept in the period after the crisis. This can be explained by higher unobserved abilities
of youth in the period after the crisis would be higher than that of youth in the period after the crisis. The
two wage pro¯les have di®erent curves. The wage pro¯le in the period before the crisis draws a wide arc.
The ¯nancial crisis of 1997 changes the arc of the curve. This is eloquently demonstrates the impact of the
¯nancial crisis on the labor market outcomes.
Before moving to the theoretical framework and formulating the empirical hypotheses, we will discuss
returns to age in more detail. The important point to note is that the curve of returns to age becomes
gentler after the crisis. This rule holds in all occupations, both white- and blue-collar. The two lines of the
returns to age intersect around the age of 20 or 25 years. The line in the period before the crisis continues
to decrease steeply after the intersection. On the other hand, the line of the period after the crisis continues
to decrease moderately. This observation needs to be explained theoretically. Our hypotheses are induced
by these structural changes on the wage equation.
2.3 Why Do Selected Entrants Experience Lower Paid Jobs over Time?
We present our empirical framework and testable hypothesis before beginning an empirical analysis. Our
theory shows the causal e®ects of labor market conditions and match quality on individual outcomes. Our
target is to estimate the impacts of entry-level labor demand conditions on employment outcomes. We
consider the following relationship between individual outcomes and labor demand conditions:
yi = ¯0 + ¯1Di(p) + ui
Di(p) = ®0 + ®1Zi + vi
where yi is employment outcome for new entrants which equals employment opportunities Ei and wages
logWi. Di(p) is the entry-level labor market conditions, and is characterized by ¯rm-speci¯c productivity
level p, with ui being unobservable characteristics for econometricians (ability, match quality, or unmeasured
errors). Estimating the impacts of (entry-level) labor market conditions on the employment outcome is our
target. This paper uses the evidence from Thailand's the ¯nancial crisis in 1997 as a marker of aggregate
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level of labor demand Zi of the variable of entry-level labor market condition Di(p). Thai ¯nancial crisis
of 1997 was an economy-wide shock and was exogenous for individual workers and potential workers (i.e.,
current students and graduates). These characteristics of the ¯nancial shock satisfy the two assumptions of
strict exogeneity (E[Zi; ui] = 0) and the causal e®ects of Zi on Di(p).
Next, we can introduce the hypotheses to be examined. To do this, we focus on returns to years of labor
market experience in the wage equation. Years of potential labor market experience re°ect ¯rm or industry
speci¯c human capital for each worker. If a worker is laid o® during a crisis or quits her current match
and moves to another ¯rm or industry, her accumulated human capital would become obsolete. The decline
of returns to experience on an aggregate level is supported by the job reallocation e®ect. If an incumbent
is not laid o® and does not quit during the crisis, it will be di±cult for her to ¯nd entry into the tight
market unless she has good luck or is highly capable. Selection becomes extremely tight for mass of new
entrants. Only workers with good luck and high capability successfully enter and survive during the crisis.
This selection e®ect pushes returns to labor market experience down. The decline of returns to experience
of the aggregate level is also supported by the selection e®ect. Testing against the following hypotheses is a
purely empirical exercise.
Crisis as an unexpected negative shock is an absolutely key assumption to do our empirical implementa-
tion. By using a macroeconomic shock as a \natural experiment," the model provides a new understanding
of the relationship between on-the-job search and wages determination in the periods before and after the
crisis. First, if incumbents tend with high probability to stay in o±ce due to lower occurrence of job reallo-
cations in the period after the crisis, then new entrants into the market will be severely restricted (by small
size of search market).
Hypothesis 1 Selection at entry level tightens after a crisis. It is di±cult for new entrants to be employed
in the period after a crisis. Average productivity among newly employed workers is higher than that among
newly employed workers in the period before a crisis.
Secondly, if a negative shock creates a large gap in employment probability between new entrants in the
periods before and after the shock, the gap will tend to persist.
Hypothesis 2 The gap in employment probability and wage level persists between new entrants in the
periods before and after a shock. New entrants experience lower paid jobs over time.
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3 Data
3.1 The Thailand Labor Force Survey
The data source used in this paper is the Thailand Labor Force Survey (hereafter LFS), 1994-2000 by the
The National Statistical O±ce (NSO) of Thailand. This individual-level data provides information on many
individual characteristics: gender, structure of family, years of schooling, years of labor market experience,
wages (or pro¯t for self-employment household and pro¯t for agricultural household), labor force status,
migration status, hours and days of weekly work, occupation, industry, region, marital status; and employer
characteristics: ¯rm size, industry, and fringe bene¯ts. LFS is carried occurs the four times per year. The
¯rst round is done in February, the dry season in Thailand. The third round is done in August, the monsoon
(agricultural) season. We only use the third round survey in order to exclude seasonal labor migration in the
dry season. The second and third rounds are done in May and November, respectively. Because LFS does
not follow individuals from year to year, this study cannot be used to obtain information on labor mobility
from the pre-crisis period to the post-crisis period. This study also uses pooled cross-sections from previous
studies on aggregate labor market and urban immigration: Yamauchi (2002)'s study about migrants in the
face of crisis in Bangkok, Kimura (2004)'s study on learning about one's own ability by youth migrants to
Bangkok.
The sample used in this paper comes not only from \Greater Bangkok Area" and other rural area; we
use the sample from the entire Kingdom of Thailand, year 1994 to year 2000. We would like to mention
the geographic characteristics. This paper adopts as GBA (Greater Bangkok Area) dummy variable which
equals 1 if a province is included in the Bangkok metropolitan area. Nearly all industries and occupations
tend to agglomerate in GBA. This classi¯cation using a regional dummy re°ects the geographic distribution
of industry and occupation in the face of crisis.
3.2 De¯nition and Construction of Treatment and Control Group
Let me summarize our data generation process for drawing strong power of identi¯cation. The details are
shown in the section on empirical methodology. This paper constructs one unique variable on the basis of the
information in the LFS, 1994-1996 and 1998-2000. This variable and some assumptions play important roles
in identifying the treatment group and control group respectively. We construct a shock-dummy variable
which identi¯es the treatment (new entrants in the period after the crisis) and control group (new entrants
in the period before the crisis) using the information on the length of working life after graduation. We
choose the variable \years of potential labor market experience" to examine the impacts of the crisis. We
identify the treatment group and control group in the face of the crisis using the individual record of years
of potential labor market experience. For the treatment group, the shock-dummy variable equals 1 if the
worker had less than 1 year of experience in the survey year 1998, less than 2 years of experience in the
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survey year 1999, and less than 3 years of experience in the survey year 2000. This group seems to have found
it particularly di±cult to get the job opportunities after entering the market due to unexpected exogenous
shock. On the other hand, the control group has already entered the labor market in the period before the
crisis.
Additionally, we set the \age at shock" dummy variable as equal to 1 if the individual's age at crisis is
a. Finally, we also de¯ne the \years of schooling at shock" dummy variable as equal to 1 if the individual's
years of schooling at the time of the crisis. We use those two dummy variables to check the parameter
changes, i.e., returns to age and returns to years of schooling due to the crisis. The Treatment group is wage
employed in the period after the crisis and the control group are those wage employed in the period before
the crisis respectively.
3.3 Descriptive Analysis
Table 2 shows the aggregate consequences of the crisis on the labor market. The variables are individual
characteristics, industry categories, and occupation categories. Individual characteristics are age, gender,
household size, years of schooling, living in Greater Bangkok Area, employment wage, log of weekly wage,
log of pro¯t for self-employment household, log of pro¯t for agricultural household, number of working days
per week, number non-working days per week, number of family workers in household, and social security
status. We would like to emphasize four points regarding the changes of individual characteristics. First,
urban population decreased in the period after the crisis, from 8.4% to 7.8%. Secondly, the log of weekly
wage and log of pro¯t for self-employment households decreased in the period after the crisis. On the other
hand, the log of pro¯t for agricultural households increased in the period after the crisis, from 6.08 to 6.14.
Thirdly, number of working days decreased from 6.27 days per week to 6.14 days per week in the period
after the crisis. Number of non-working days increased from 0.16 days per week to 0.21 days per week in the
period after the crisis. However the standard deviations of both working and non-working days increased
in the period after the crisis. Finally, social security status increased sharply in the period after the crisis.
The percentage of workers belonging to ¯rms with social security increased from 4.5% to 8.9% in the period
after the crisis. The percentage of workers enrolled in social security also increased from 2.7% to 9.6%.
Industry features are summarized in Table 3. The highlight is decrease in the population in the construc-
tion sector in the period after the crisis: from 5.5% to 4.1%. Heavy industry o®ered many job opportunities
in the period after the crisis. Occupation features are summarized in Table 4. The population of craftsmen
decreased in the period after the crisis: from 12% to 10%. The population of professional, technical, ad-
ministrative, and managerial workers increased in the period after the crisis. The tables present an outline
of the labor market in the period before and after the crisis. These tables show that aggregate employment
opportunities seem to have remained stable between periods before and after the crisis. In this paper, we
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look more carefully into the entry level.
We will focus attention now on the years of schooling and wage level. We decompose the aggregate level
into simple occupation categories: white- and blue-collar simply. White-collar jobs cover occupations involv-
ing professional, technical, administrative, executive, managerial, and clerical work. Blue-collar jobs cover
occupations including sales, mining, transport and communication, production, and service. Agricultural
workers are excluded from blue-collar workers. Both Table 5 and 6 present means and standard deviations
for the main variables of our interests: years of schooling and log of weekly wages. Because of the showing
clear contrast between the situations in the periods before and after the crisis, our sample in this summary
is restricted by age and working status. Age is restricted to individuals from 13 to 59 years of age. Column
1 represents data for wage employees in the period before the crisis. Column 2 also shows data for wage
employees in the period after the crisis. The table reports the data on years of schooling for two types of
new entrants. Row 1 shows a steep rise of average years of schooling for wage employees in the period after
the crisis. This re°ects the increasing of educational attainment. Average years of schooling for white-collar
workers, blue-collar workers, GBA workers, and rural area workers are also rose among those in the period
after the crisis. This table shows the market selection and trend of educational attainment. Average years
of schooling among the whole population and average years of schooling among wage employees 7.02 years
and 8.63 years, respectively in the period before the crisis. Average years of schooling among the whole
population and average years of schooling among wage employees were 7.61 years and 9.27 years in the
period after the crisis. The increase of 0.39 years of schooling is a contribution of the aggregate trend during
the periods. Market selection required an additional 1.61 years in the period before the crisis for wage
employment and additional 1.66 years in the period after the crisis.
Table 6 shows the log of weekly wages for wage employees in the period before the crisis and for those
employed in the period after the crisis. The wages for both white- and blue-collar workers decreased in the
period after the crisis. But this was not a sharp decrease. The wage levels are quite similar between the
two periods for GBA workers and rural workers. A rigorous analysis of the wage level will be given in the
section on empirical results.
4 The Impacts of Crisis on the Entry-Level Labor Market
4.1 Empirical Methodology
We examine the e®ect of the crisis on employment for less-experienced workers, especially, for new entrants
into the labor market. We assume that the crisis is an unexpected shock for every worker and every new
graduate. No worker can expect how the shock will a®ect occupations, industries, and employment status.
Our empirical methodology is quite similar to Du°o (2001)'s work on Indonesian school construction between
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1973 and 1978 and Crepon and Kramarz (2002)'s study on the 1982 mandatory reduction of the workweek
in France. Table 7 shows the dates of entry and years of potential labor market experiences for individual
workers. Years of potential labor market experience means the age of an individual minus years of schooling
completed in each survey year. New entrants into the labor market in the period before the crisis are
brie°y described in C1 (control). The di®erence between the two types of new entrants is whether or not an
individual is working in the period after the crisis. New entrants accumulate labor market experience every
year. On the other hand, new entrants in the period before the crisis who were working in the period after
the crisis are summarized as T1 (type1 treatment group). New entrants in the period after the crisis are also
summarized as T2 (type 2 treatment group). We can observe that new entrants in 1994 had seven years of
experience in the labor market by 2000 and new entrants in 1997 have four years of experience by 2000 from
Table 7. An unexpected shock comes once in Thailand, in the summer and fall of 1997. We expect that
it was more di±cult for each T2 entrant to enter the labor market in the period during and after the crisis
than compared to new entrants in the period before the crisis in groups C1 or T1.
Our empirical methodology requires the following two assumptions to be made in building an experimen-
tal setting as suggested by Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996): random assignment and exclusion restrictions.
Random assignment means that the crisis was an unexpected shock for incumbent workers and new entrants
in labor market and that the treatment assignment T is random. The exclusion restriction means that each
individual had no incentive to delay the timing of entry during the crisis period. This empirical methodol-
ogy is straightforward, because the ¯nancial crisis as experiment took place at random. This randomization
gives us a reduced-form approach for estimating the e®ect of the crisis on less-experienced workers. The
reduced form e®ect of crisis can be shown here by comparing the mean labor market outcomes (employment
and wages) in new entrants in the period after the crisis and new entrants in the period before the crisis.
We de¯ne Eilt as an employment dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual i is a waged worker with
a length of potential labor market experience l in year t. Dlit is a Shock dummy variable equal to 1 if the
potential labor market experience l at year t is less than 1 year in 1998 (that is, D1i1998 = 1), less than 2
years in 1999 (that is, D2i1999 = 1), and less than 3 years in 2000 (that is, D3i2000 = 1). Dlit covers all new
entrants with T -label. This is the central point of the data collection. The reduced form di®erence is:
E
³
ET1li + E
T2
li j Dlit = 1
´
¡ E
³
EC1li j Dlit = 0
´
;
where ET1li and E
T2
li are employment dummies for members of the treatment group (T ) who are employed
in the period after the crisis t=1998, 1999, 2000. On the other hand, EC1li is an employment dummy for
members of the control group (C1) who are employed in the periods before the crisis, t=1994, 1995, and
1996.
We can run the following regression to test the empirical hypothesis that selection at entry level tightens
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after a crisis especially for new entrants in the period after the crisis with less than 1 year of potential labor
market experience (that is, the new graduates from each level of school):
E1it = X1it¯1 +D1i1998°1998 +D1i1999°1999 +D1i2000°2000 + v1it; (1)
where the vector of individual characteristics with 1 year of potential labor market experience is de¯ned by
X1it (including gender, age, years of schooling, and region), and v1it is the mixture of unobserved individual
characteristics for workers with 1 year of potential labor market experience. The coe±cient of the D1it
dummy variable °t captures the impacts of timing of entry on employment probability for new entrants in
the period after the crisis (t = T2) relative to new entrants in the period before the crisis (t = C1). The
control group is expected to have a higher employment probability than the treatment group. We expect
each °t to be signi¯cantly negative. Here we summarize the testable hypotheses: selection at entry level
tightens after a crisis for new entrants.
We turn to the next reduced form di®erence of labor market outcomes:
E
³
logW T1li + logW
T2
li j ET1li ; ET2li Dlit = 1
´
¡E
³
logWC1li j EC1li ; Dlit = 0
´
;
where logWC1li is the log of weekly wages in the period before (t = C1). logW
T1
li and logW
T2
li are logs of
weekly wages in the period after the crisis. EC1li , E
T1
li , and E
T2
li are employment dummy variables for the
period before (t = C1) and after (t = T1 and t = T2) the crisis, respectively. The following wage regression
is also used to test our empirical hypothesis that selection tightens after a crisis especially for new entrants
who have 1 year of potential labor market experience:
logW1it = X1it¯1 +D1i1998´1998 +D1i1999´1999 +D1i2000´2000 + u1it; (2)
where u1it is the unobserved characteristics and/or quality of match. The coe±cient of the D1it dummy
variable ´t captures the impacts of crisis on the level of wages for new entrants in the period after the crisis
relative to new entrants in the period before the crisis. Members of the latter group were able to enter the
market without experiencing a negative shock. On the other hand, we expect that new entrants will ¯nd
it more di±cult to be employed (that is, ET21i = 1) in the period after the crisis. Because of this selection
at entry level, we also expect that average productivity and/or quality of match of newly employees in the
period after the crisis will be higher than for newly employees already working in the period before the
crisis. We present the following testable hypothesis: average productivity and/or quality of match is higher
for new entrants in the period after the crisis. The level of each ´t captures this.
The above is our empirical methodology for testing the hypothesis that selection at the entry level in
the labor market tightens for new entrants in the period after the crisis. If selection matters, the average
productivity and quality of match is higher for those newly employed in the period after the crisis than
newly employed in the period before the crisis.
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4.2 Result
Based on the randomization, we identify new entrants in the period after the crisis D1it = 1 as the treatment
group and the new entrants in the period before the crisis D1it = 0 as the control group. As a result,
our estimation, testing, and empirical results are also straightforward. First, we test the entry-selection
hypothesis to check the marginal e®ects on the D1it dummy in the probability model of employment and
to check the estimates of the D1it dummy in the wages equation. The entry-selection hypothesis is that
market selection for new entrants is tight in the period after the crisis. This means that the realized average
productivity and/or quality of match for new entrants may be higher than that for new entrants in the
period before the crisis. We focus on the empirical results, controlling for individual characteristics, regional
characteristics, and industry characteristics. Table 8 provides support for the entry-selection hypothesis:
the marginal e®ect in equation (5) of D1i1998 shows that new entrants in the period after the crisis had
an approximately 7% smaller probability of employment than new entrants in the period before the crisis
with the same 1 year of potential labor market experience. This means that the probability of employment
was 7% lower when the timing of new entrance moves from the period before the crisis (D1i1998 = 0) to
the period after it (D1i1998 = 1). This result means that it was di±cult for new entrants in the period
after the crisis to be wage workers (or to ¯nd a good job matching). The negative labor demand shock was
compensated for by the high quality of match. New entrants have had di±culty ¯nding a good partner with
high quality of match.
Secondly, the marginal e®ect in equation (5) of D1i1999 reveals that new entrants in the period after the
crisis had an approximately 1.1% smaller probability of employment than new entrants in the period before
the crisis with the same 1 year of potential labor market experience. But di®erence is insigni¯cant. Finally,
the marginal e®ect in equation (5) of D1i2000 means that new entrants in the period after the crisis had an
approximately 11.3% smaller probability of employment than new entrants in the period before the crisis
with the same 1 year of potential labor market experience. The di®erence is also insigni¯cant.
With regard to the wage regression, the full model (5) in Table 9 does not provide support for one
aspect of the entry-selection hypothesis: new entrants in the period after the crisis had an approximately
6.4 percent lower wage level than new entrants in the period before the crisis with 1 year of potential labor
market experience in 1998. The result of the full model (5) for D1i1999 shows that new entrants in the period
after the crisis experienced an approximately 10.1% lower wage level than new entrants in the period before
the crisis with 1 year of potential labor market experience. The result of the full model (5) for D1i2000 also
¯nds that new entrants in the period after the crisis experienced an approximately 14.1% lower wage level
than new entrants in the period after the crisis with 1 year of potential labor market experience. In short,
we cannot fully support the entry-selection hypothesis in the face of the crisis to test the marginal e®ects on
the dummy variable in the employment probability model and the estimates of the coe±cient of the dummy
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variable in the wage equation, respectively. We compare these results with the results from subsample with
2 or 3 years of potential labor market experience at the next stage.
5 Do the Financial Crisis Have Lasting Impacts for New Entrants?
5.1 The Short-term Consequences of Entry in a Recession Period
When do the disadvantages of entering at a bad time disappear? We check the dynamic impacts of crisis
on employment probability and wage level. Our empirical methodologies apply to this question. First, we
already have the coe±cient of the D1it dummy variable °t, which captures the impacts of timing of entry on
employment probability for new entrants in the period after the crisis (t = T2) relative to new entrants in
the period before it (t = C1). Secondly, we need to ¯nd the coe±cient of the D2it and D3it dummy variables,
respectively. Finally, we can compare the level of the coe±cients to examine the persistence of the di®erence
between entrants in the period before and after the crisis. Our theory predicts that this di®erence will not
persist over time as long as the shock is temporary.
We perform the following regression to test the empirical hypothesis that the di®erence in labor market
outcome E2it persists over time:
E2it = X2it¯2 +D2i1998µ1998 +D2i1999µ1999 +D2i2000µ2000 + v2it; (3)
and
E3it = X3it¯3 +B3i1998¼1998 +B3i1999¼1999 +D3i2000¼2000 + v3it; (4)
where D2i1998 is equal to 1 if the potential labor market experience l is 2 years in 1998. The D2i1998 = 1
sample is new entrants in the period before the crisis who were still a®ected from shock. D3i1998 and D3i1998
are equal to 1 if the potential labor market experience l is 3 years in 1998 or 1999. The D3i1998 = 1 sample
and D3i1999 are also new entrants in the period before the crisis who were a®ected by the shock. The vector
of individual characteristics of workers with 2 or 3 years of potential labor market experience is de¯ned
by X2it or X3it respectively. The terms v2it and v3it are mixtures of unobserved individual characteristics
and/or quality of match for workers with 2 or 3 years of potential labor market experience. The coe±cient
of the D2it dummy variable µt captures the impacts of timing of entry on employment probability for new
entrants within the 2 years following the crisis (t = T1 and T2) relative to new entrants with the 2 years
in the period before the crisis (t = C1). The coe±cient of the D3it dummy variable ¼t also captures the
impacts of timing of entry on employment probability for new entrants within the 3 years following the
(t = T ) relative to new entrants within the 3 years before the crisis (t = T1 and T2). It is expected that
the control group will continue to have a higher employment probability than the treatment group. We
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expect that °1998 < µ1999 < ¼2000 if the negative impact of the crisis is highest at year 1998 and the shock
is temporary. We follow the same cohort who entered the labor market in 1998. If the shock is temporary
soon disappears, individual will be able to ¯nd wage employees. We also expect that °1999 < µ2000. We also
follow the same cohort who entered the labor market in 1999. The empirical results are shown in the next
section.
Next, we perform the following regression to test the empirical hypothesis that the di®erence of produc-
tivity and/or quality of match persists over time:
logW2it = X2it¯2 +D2i1998½1998 +D2i1999½1999 +D2i2000½2000 + u2it: (5)
and
logW3it = X3it¯3 +D3i1998»1998 +D3i1999»1999 +D3i2000»2000 + u3it: (6)
where u2it or u3it are unobserved characteristics and/or quality of match for workers with 2 or 3 years of
potential labor market experience. We also expect ´1998 > ½1999 > »2000 as long as the tight selection at
entry level in 1998 and the shock is temporary. If the shock is temporary, each individual will be able
to enter the labor market when it disappears. Average productivity increases over time. We expect that
´1999 > ½2000. We also follow the same cohort who entered the labor market in 1999.
5.2 Result
We check the marginal e®ect of employment probability for individuals with 2 years of potential labor
market experience and 3 years of potential labor market experience. Equation (5) in Table 10 suggests that
we cannot observe a persistent gap between new entrants in the period before and after the crisis with 2
years of potential labor market experience. The marginal e®ect of D2i1998 shows that new entrants with 2
years of experience in 1998 had an approximately 9.4% lower probability of employment than new entrants
with 2 years of experience in the period before the crisis. There was also some disadvantage for new entrants
in the period after the crisis until they reached 2 years of potential labor market experience. On the other
hand, the marginal e®ect of D2i1999 in equation (5) shows that new entrants with 2 years of experience
in 1999 did not have a signi¯cant di®erence with new entrants with 2 years of experience in the period
before the crisis. This result means that there was no di®erence in employment probability between new
entrants in the period before and after the crisis with the same 2 years of potential labor market experience.
However, the marginal e®ect of D2i2000 shows that new entrants with 2 years of experience in 1998 had an
approximately 6.1% lower probability of employment than new entrants with 2 years of experience in the
period before the crisis.
Table 11 shows the result of the wage equation for a subsample of workers with 2 years of potential labor
market experience: the estimates for the full model (5), D2i1998 had an approximately 6.9% lower wage
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level than new entrants in the period before the crisis with 2 years of potential labor market experience.
New entrants in the period after the crisis (D2i1999) had an approximately 13.9% lower wage level than
new entrants in the period before the crisis with 2 years of potential labor market experience. Finally, new
entrants in the period after the crisis (D2i2000) also had an approximately 17.4% lower wage level than new
entrants in the period before the crisis with 2 years of potential labor market experience.
The estimates for the full model (5) in Table 12 also reveal a gap between new entrants in the period
before and after the crisis with 3 years of potential labor market experience. The marginal e®ect of D3i1998
shows that new entrants with 3 years of experience in the period after the crisis had an approximately 6.9%
lower probability of employment than new entrants with 3 years of experience in the period before the crisis.
There is some disadvantage for new entrants in a period after the crisis until they gain 3 years of potential
labor market experience. These results in Table 12 show that there was almost no di®erence of employment
probability between new entrants in the period before and after the crisis with the same 3 years of potential
labor market experience.
Finally, Table 13 shows the result of the wage equation for a subsample of workers with 3 years of
potential labor market experience: in the estimate for the full model (5) in this table, new entrants in the
period after the crisis D3i1998 had an approximately 7.8% signi¯cantly lower wage level than new entrants
in the period before the crisis with 3 years of potential labor market experience. New entrants in the period
after the crisis D3i1999 also had an signi¯cant, approximately 10.7% lower wage level than new entrants in
the period before the crisis with 3 years of potential labor market experience. The same is true for new
entrants in the period after the crisis D3i2000. They had a signi¯cant, approximately 12.7% lower wage level
than new entrants in the period before the crisis with 3 years of potential labor market experience. This
is signi¯cant because employment selection becomes tight when new entrants in the period after the crisis
gain 3 years of potential labor market experience relative to new entrants in the period before the crisis.
It follows from what has been shown that no persistent di®erence of employment probability can be
observed between the treatment and control group over time. The gap in the probability of employment for
new entrants in 1998 would decreased signi¯cantly from 7% at the entry level to an insigni¯cant amount 2
or 3 years after the shock. On the other hand, wage level decreased over time, from 6.4% in 1998 to 12.7%
in 2000.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposed two testable hypotheses for to explaining the impact of crisis on outcomes in the entry-
level labor market. The ¯rst is the entry-selection hypothesis, i.e., that employment selection tightens for
new entrants in the period after the crisis with 1 year of potential labor market experience. This hypothesis
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predicts that average productivity or unobserved match quality is higher for those workers compared to new
entrants in the period before the crisis. The second hypothesis is the persistence hypothesis, i.e., that the
gap of employment probability and wage level between new entrants in the period before and after the shock
persists over time. In conclusion, convincing evidence from Thailand leads support to be hypothesis that
the losses of employment opportunities and wages are more signi¯cant for new entrants after the crisis. We
¯nd that new entrants before the crisis also experienced job losses and wage losses. However, these losses are
smaller than that of new entrants after the crisis. This suggests that the role of the internal labor market
in a developing economy changes with an aggregate shock. We also ¯nd that new entrants after the crisis
experienced 10% lower wage level than new entrants before the crisis over time.
We note some shortcomings in our experimental design. This paper utilizes evidence from the Thai
¯nancial crisis in 1997 to examine the impact of an aggregate shock on employment opportunities and
wages. Using the macroeconomic evidence, we simply distinguish between the treatment group, which is
a®ected by the aggregate shock and the control group, which is not a®ected by the aggregate shock. Our
empirical methodology simply estimates the impact of the shock on the labor market at the aggregate level.
We do not consider microeconomic heterogeneity or treatment group heterogeneity; in reality, however,
there are large di®erentials of the impact between industries in the period after the crisis. This is one
shortcoming. Another shortcoming is that we ignore the spillover e®ect from the ¯nancial sectors to other
export/import oriented-manufacturing sectors et al to understand the aggregate e®ect of the crisis. A further
extension is behavior towards employment and wage risk. For example, studying workers' search intensity,
unemployment duration, shifts in reserve wages, decisions on internal migration from rural to urban/urban
to rural areas, and intra-household allocation of labor supply during a crisis are tasks for the future.
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Table 1: Wages Equation in the Periods Before and After the crisis
Variable Before the Crisis After the Crisis
Age .050 .044
(.003) (.002)
Age squared -.0003 -.0002
(.000) (.000)
Years of schooling .087 .085
(.001) (.001)
Male .196 .134
(.008) (.006)
GBA dummy .264 .291
(.011) (.007)
Intercept 4.881 5.007
(.090) (.057)
Adjusted R2 .559 .570
Obs. 80511 74768
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of weekly wages. Explanatory variables which are excluded in this table are the
industry dummy variables. Age is restricted from 13 to 59 years of age. GBA dummy means Greater Bangkok Area dummy,
which is equal to 1 if the individual is living in Bangkok Metropolitan Area. Standard deviations are in parentheses. All
explanatory variables are signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at the 99% con¯dence level.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996 and 1998-2000.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Before the Crisis After the Crisis
Age 33.097 33.711
(12.741) (12.667)
Male .466 .468
(.499) (.499)
Household Size 4.371 4.240
(3.097) (3.066)
Years of Schooling 7.025 7.616
(4.316) (4.498)
GBA .0839 .0783
(.277) (.269)
Wage Employed .392 .396
(.488) (.489)
Log of Weekly Wage 7.191 7.179
(.747) (.740)
Log of Pro¯t for Self-employed 7.380 7.239
(.930) (.855)
Log of Pro¯t for Farmer 6.083 6.145
(1.038) (.964)
Number of Working Days 6.278 6.142
(1.037) (1.130)
Number of Non-working Days .160 .211
(.658) (.773)
Number of Family Workers 1.886 1.868
(1.013) (.952)
Social Security .045 .089
(.208) (.284)
Social Security Member .027 .096
(.163) (.297)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Age is restricted from 13 to 59 years of age.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1998-2000.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics (Industry)
Variable Before the Crisis After the Crisis
Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting, and Fishing .359 .348
(.480) (.476)
Mining and Quarrying .002 .001
(.042) (.038)
Light Manufacturing .073 .072
(.260) (.258)
Heavy Manufacturing .062 .065
(.241) (.246)
Construction, Repair, and Demolition .055 .041
(.227) (.198)
Electricity, Gas, Water, and Sanitary .008 .007
(.088) (.086)
Commerce .187 .195
(.390) (.396)
Transport and Communication .034 .032
(.181) (.175)
Services .221 .238
(.415) (.426)
Other .0005 .0003
(.021) (.017)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Age is restricted from 13 to 59 years of age.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1998-2000.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics (Occupation)
Variable Before the Crisis After the Crisis
Professional and Technical workers .082 .093
(.274) (.291)
Administrative, Executive, and Managerial Workers .036 .040
(.187) (.197)
Clerical Workers .050 .045
(.218) (.207)
Sales Workers .179 .190
(.383) (.393)
Farmers and Fishermen .360 .349
(.480) (.477)
Miners and Quarrymen .0004 .0005
(.020) (.022)
Workers in Transport and Communication .043 .041
(.203) (.198)
Craftsmen .117 .103
(.321) (.304)
Machine Operators .063 .067
(.244) (.249)
Service Workers .070 .071
(.258) (.256)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Age is restricted from 13 to 59 years of age.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1998-2000.
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Table 5: Average Years of Schooling in the Periods Before and After the Crisis
Variable Before the Crisis After the Crisis
Total 8.626 9.274
(4.978) (5.043)
White-collar Worker 13.249 13.682
(3.963) (3.780)
Blue-collar Worker 6.6301 7.276
(3.936) (4.205)
GBA Worker 9.562 10.177
(5.038) (5.045)
Rural Area Worker 8.511 9.170
(4.959) (5.032)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Age is restricted from 13 to 59 years of age. The sample is restricted by wage
employees.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1998-2000.
Table 6: Average Log of Wages in the Periods Before and After the Crisis
Variable Before the Crisis After the Crisis
Total 7.327 7.328
(.745) (.733)
White-collar Worker 7.815 7.777
(.618) (.629)
Blue-collar Worker 6.945 6.932
(.598) (.572)
GBA Worker 7.550 7.541
(.693) (.695)
Rural Area Worker 7.294 7.298
(.746) (.733)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Age is restricted from 13 to 59 years of age. The sample is restricted by wage
employees.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1998-2000.
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Table 7: Years of Entry and Length of Experience: Treatment and Control Group
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1 C1 C1 C1 C1 T2 T2 T2
2 C1 C1 C1 T1 T2 T2
3 C1 C1 T1 T1 T2
4 C1 T1 T1 T1
5 T1 T1 T1
6 T1 T1
7 T1
Notes: Each column indicates year of entry. Each row shows years of potential labor market experience calculated by age minus
her years of schooling completed at the survey year. The ¯nancial crisis struck the market in the summer and fall of 1997. T1
means the group of new entrants in the period before the crisis but working in the period after the crisis (treatment group 1).
T2 means the group of new entrants in the period after the crisis (treatment group 2). On the other hand, C1 means the group
of new entrants in the period before the crisis (control group).
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Table 8: Marginal E®ects of the Shock Dummy in the Employment at the Entry Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
D1i1998 (T2) ¡:050 ¡:091 ¡:079 ¡:096 ¡:070
(.025) (.027) (.025) (.029) (.030)
D1i1999 (T2) ¡:071 ¡:104 ¡:090 ¡:020 ¡:011
(.026) (.029) (.028) (.031) (.033)
D1i2000 (T2) ¡:057 ¡:126 ¡:103 ¡:036 ¡:026
(.027) (.029) (.030) (.032) (.031)
Age - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Male - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years of Schooling - Yes Yes Yes Yes
GBA - - Yes Yes Yes
White-collar - - - Yes Yes
Firm Size - - - Yes Yes
Industry - - - - Yes
Adjusted R2 .003 .139 .187 .464 .549
Obs. 7295 7295 7295 7295 7283
Notes:
1. The dependent variable is a wage employment dummy which is equal to 1 if individual i is a wage worker, and equal to zero
if individual i is unemployed, self-employed, a farmer, or working in the agricultural sector.
2. The D1it dummy variable is equal to 1 if the individual's labor market experience is less than 1 year at year t=1998, 1999,
and 2000. The D1it dummy variable is equal to zero if the individual's labor market experience is less than 1 year at year
t=1994, 1995, and 1996.
3. We restrict all samples to the entry level. That is, the treatment group is new entrants in the period after the crisis who
have less than 1 year of potential experience of labor market in year 1998. Control group covers new entrants who are less than
1 year of potential labor market experience in the period before the ¯nancial crisis.
4. GBA means the Greater Bangkok Area dummy variable.
5. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996 and 1998-2000.
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Table 9: E®ects of the Shock Dummy in the Wage at the Entry Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
D1i1998 (T2) ¡:010 ¡:085 ¡:077 ¡:073 ¡:064
(.057) (.042) (.040) (.038) (.037)
D1i1999 (T2) ¡:255 ¡:192 ¡:166 ¡:110 ¡:101
(.060) (.040) (.036) (.037) (.037)
D1i2000 (T2) ¡:182 ¡:236 ¡:204 ¡:155 ¡:141
(.063) (.045) (.041) (.038) (.038)
Age - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Squared - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age cubed - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Male - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years of Schooling - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years of Schooling squared - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Working hours - Yes Yes Yes Yes
GBA - - Yes Yes Yes
White-collar - - - Yes Yes
Firm Size - - Yes Yes
Industry - - - - Yes
Intercept 7:048 10:415 6:81 5:181 5:500
(0.032) (2.836) (2.709) (2.740) (2.730)
Adjusted R2 .021 .500 .565 .607 .612
Obs. 3081 3081 3081 3081 3081
Notes:
1. The dependent variable is the log of weekly wages.
2. The D1it dummy variable is equal to 1 if the individual's labor market experience is less than 1 year at year t=1998, 1999,
and 2000. The D1it dummy variable is equal to zero if the individual's labor market experience is less than 1 year at year
t=1994, 1995, and 1996.
3. We restrict all samples to the entry level. That is, the treatment group is new entrants in the period after the crisis who
have less than 1 year of potential experience of labor market in year 1998. Control group covers new entrants who are less than
1 year of potential labor market experience in the period before the ¯nancial crisis.
4. GBA means the Greater Bangkok Area dummy variable.
5. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996 and 1998-2000.
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Table 10: Marginal E®ects of the Shock Dummy in Employment within the 2 Years After the
Shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
D2i1998 (T1) ¡:045 ¡:106 ¡:090 ¡:113 ¡:094
(.026) (.025) (.025) (.031) (.030)
D2i1999 (T2) ¡:050 ¡:091 ¡:024 ¡:020 ¡:024
(.026) (.026) (.027) (.032) (.032)
D2i2000 (T2) ¡:066 ¡:105 ¡:092 ¡:068 ¡:061
(.026) (.026) (.025) (.030) (.031)
Age - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Male - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years of Schooling - Yes Yes Yes Yes
GBA - - Yes Yes Yes
White-collar - - - Yes Yes
Firm Size - - Yes Yes
Industry - - - - Yes
Adjusted R2 .04 .123 .195 .461 .554
Obs. 6534 6534 6534 6534 6534
Notes:
1. The dependent variable is a wage employment dummy which is equal to 1 if individual i is a wage worker, and equal to zero
if individual i is unemployed, self-employed, a farmer, or working in the agricultural sector.
2. The D2i1998 dummy variable is equal to 1 if the individual's labor market experience is 2 years in 1998. The D2it dummy
variable is equal to 1 if the individual labor market experience is less than 2 years in t=1999 and 2000. D2it dummy variable is
equal to zero if the individual labor market experience is less than 2 years in t=1994, 1995, and 1996. That is, the treatment
group is new entrants in the period after the crisis who have 2 years of potential experience of labor market in year 1999. Control
group covers new entrants who have 2 years of potential labor market experience in the period before the ¯nancial crisis.
3. GBA means the Greater Bangkok Area dummy variable.
4. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996 and 1998-2000.
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Table 11: E®ects of the Shock Dummy in the Wage within the 2 years After the Shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
D2i1998 (T1) :049 ¡:121 ¡:102 ¡:077 ¡:069
(.068) (.045) (.038) (.036) (.035)
D2i1999 (T2) ¡:217 ¡:233 ¡:215 ¡:142 ¡:139
(.066) (.046) (.042) (.044) (.044)
D2i2000 (T2) ¡:220 ¡:267 ¡:281 ¡:204 ¡:174
(.060) (.047) (.042) (.038) (.038)
Age - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Squared - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Cubed - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Male - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years of Schooling - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years of Schooling Squared - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Working Hours - Yes Yes Yes Yes
GBA - - Yes Yes Yes
White-collar - - - Yes Yes
Firm Size - - - Yes Yes
Industry - - - - Yes
Intercept 6:988 6:015 6:025 6:393 6:559
(.031) (.856) (.750) (.795) (.780)
Adjusted R2 .023 .544 .607 .642 .653
Obs. 2709 2709 2709 2709 2709
Notes:
1. The dependent variable is the log of weekly wages.
2. The D2i1998 dummy variable is equal to 1 if the individual's labor market experience is 2 years in 1998. The D2it dummy
variable is equal to 1 if the individual labor market experience is less than 2 years in t=1999 and 2000. D2it dummy variable is
equal to zero if the individual labor market experience is less than 2 years in t=1994, 1995, and 1996. That is, the treatment
group is new entrants in the period after the crisis who have 2 years of potential experience of labor market in year 1999. Control
group covers new entrants who have 2 years of potential labor market experience in the period before the ¯nancial crisis.
3. GBA means the Greater Bangkok Area dummy variable.
4. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996 and 1998-2000.
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Table 12: Marginal E®ects of the Shock Dummy in the Employment within the 3 years After
the Shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
D3i1998 (T1) :000 ¡:045 ¡:051 ¡:094 ¡:069
(.024) (.023) (.023) (.028) (028)
D3i1999 (T1) ¡:042 ¡:086 ¡:076 ¡:045 ¡:053
(.025) (.026) (.025) (.029) (029)
D3i2000 (T2) ¡:038 ¡:068 ¡:092 ¡:051 ¡:030
(.025) (.025) (.025) (.029) (.031)
Age - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Male - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years of Schooling - Yes Yes Yes Yes
GBA - - Yes Yes Yes
White-collar - - - Yes Yes
Firm Size - - - Yes Yes
Industry - - - - Yes
Adjusted R2 .001 .055 .121 .389 .491
Obs. 7440 7440 7440 7440 7436
Notes:
1. The dependent variable is a wage employment dummy which is equal to 1 if individual i is a wage worker, and equal to zero
if individual i is unemployed, self-employed, a farmer, or working in the agricultural sector.
2. The D3it dummy variable is equal to 1 if the individual's labor market experience is 3 years in t= 1998 and 1999. D3i1998
and D3i1999 are new entrants in the period before the crisis but working in the period after the crisis.
3. The D3i2000 dummy variable is equal to 1 if the individual labor market experience is 3 years in 2000. That is, the treatment
group is new entrants in the period after the crisis who have 3 years in the potential experience of labor market in 2000. The
Control group covers new entrants who have 3 years of potential labor market experience in the period before the ¯nancial
crisis.
4. GBA means the Greater Bangkok Area dummy variable.
5. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996 and 1998-2000.
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Table 13: E®ects of Shock Dummy in the Wage within the 3 years After the Shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
D3i1998 (T1) :057 ¡:078 ¡:091 ¡:082 ¡:078
(.050) (.037) (.035) (.034) (.033)
D3i1999 (T1) ¡:078 ¡:176 ¡:167 ¡:119 ¡:107
(.063) (.043) (.040) (.038) (.038)
D3i2000 (T2) ¡:085 ¡:169 ¡:179 ¡:140 ¡:127
(.051) (.040) (.038) (.038) (.038)
Age - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Squared - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Cubed - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Male - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years of Schooling - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years of Schooling Squared - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Working Hours - Yes Yes Yes Yes
GBA - - Yes Yes Yes
White-collar - - - Yes Yes
Firm Size - - - Yes Yes
Industry - - - - Yes
Intercept 6:874 6:723 6:686 6:388 6:351
(.027) (.730) (.716) (.693) (.665)
Adjusted R2 .005 .500 .542 .593 .603
Obs. 3372 3372 3372 3372 3372
Notes:
1. The dependent variable is the log of weekly wages.
2. The D3it dummy variable is equal to 1 if the individual's labor market experience is 3 years in t= 1998 and 1999. D3i1998
and D3i1999 are new entrants in the period before the crisis but working in the period after the crisis.
3. The D3i2000 dummy variable is equal to 1 if the individual labor market experience is 3 years in 2000. That is, the treatment
group is new entrants in the period after the crisis who have 3 years in the potential experience of labor market in 2000. The
Control group covers new entrants who have 3 years of potential labor market experience in the period before the ¯nancial
crisis.
4. GBA means the Greater Bangkok Area dummy variable.
5. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996 and 1998-2000.
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